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As something of an outsider to the study
of “causal cognition,” I want briefly to
query what it might be taken to mean
in general—outside of any particular dis-
ciplinary understanding. Next, from that
perspective I look at some empirical
approaches to selecting problem-relevant
senses of causality, and senses in which
cognition might be seen as causal. I then
turn, at more length, to the nature and
significance of collective causal cognition,
including the cultural models type.
THE SUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVE—OUR
COGNITION OF CAUSALITY
Our default senses of what we mean by
causality vary from one another. My own
personal default is that causality is human
and individual (vs. collective), and that
culture provides expectations regarding
what kinds of causality are understood to
work in the world, what kinds apply to “all
people” and what kinds (physical, psycho-
logical, social, etc.) apply in what form to
other individuals.
One can, also, separately—as an outside
observer—consider the causal processes
that one sees working on or in a group—
from mob behavior on up. Some of this
attribution of causal processes seems uni-
versal while other seems culture-specific,
or, even, more individual.
A RANGE OF MEANINGS AND MEASURES
But note that the issue depends on
what one means by “cause” and by
“cognition”—and thus on where one’s
interests lie. There exist various (well-
known!) kinds of “causes” in addition
to the efficient (or active) causes I
opened with—such as final causes,
indirect causes, enabling conditions,
and so forth. “Cognition” can range
from individual knowledge without any
active decision-making element, through
more broadly defined knowledge that
includes an individual’s potential action
plans, to collectively held knowledge
including appropriate collective action.
Alternatively, “cognition” can go to the
root of action, as in the “flight/fight
response,” where a uniform physiological
response in the brain can be interpreted
as fear (leading to flight) or aggression
(leading to fight)—depending on the
situation/context and on one’s prior expe-
rience. One’s modeling of the mental states
of other beings—“theory of mind”—also
represents a potentially causative cognitive
activity.
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
One way to approach the general issue of
causal cognition might be to take every-
thing that is needed for a simulation of
some action/event (such as, for exam-
ple, Schank and Abelson, 1977 restau-
rant simulation) and then see what of
that is cognitive—and in what sense.
But I suspect that the answer might be
overwhelming in both its breadth and its
length!
More sensible, perhaps, is for one to
consider why in particular one is ask-
ing about “causal cognition” and see
what speaks to that particular instance or
version.
As an ethnographer one can turn to
people’s everyday default senses of what
they mean when they speak of the “cause”
of some activity or situation. Based on
Evans-Pritchard’s classic Zande example
(Evans-Pritchard, 1937; pp. 69–70), one
might ask “why did the corn crib fall on
Uncle Joe?” The answer is the answerer’s
sense of what “caused” it to fall. That
is, the answer is an instance of cognition
about causality. If the view is widely shared
within the culture, we have an instance of
culturally shared cognition, and if people
in the culture act on the answer (based on
shared and accepted views of, say, crime
and action), then we have cognitively
caused social action.
If, in the Zande example, an actor
argues for a particular response—based on
what happened and on those shared and
accepted views of crime and action—then
we have an instance of individual cogni-
tive causality (since her understanding has
led to her arguing a case). Evans-Pritchard
says the typical Zande answer would be
a statement about whose witchcraft trig-
gered the collapse. And a social witchcraft
settlement process might be initiated. The
process would involve culturally-based
understandings of what kinds of events
trigger witchcraft accusations.
In my American culture the answer
would be “because the crib was rotten
from a termite infestation”—a material
state answer. And possibly the polity might
enact stricter corn crib inspection stan-
dards, or punish the builder for faulty
construction practices. Evan-Pritchard’s
Zande are aware of the risk posed by a ter-
mite infestation, but are more concerned
with why the collapse happened particu-
larly when Joe was there. We, on the other
hand, tend to dismiss the timing ques-
tion with “It’s chance” or “Shit happens”
responses.
But, the range of “causes” is still far
from exhausted. We can come up with
a raft of enabling causes. For example,
why was the corn crib built (in that place,
and so insubstantially)? Why was Uncle
Joe sleeping there? And, for that matter,
why were the Azande people there (vs.
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somewhere else) growing corn that had to
be stored in that manner?
COLLECTIVE COGNITION AND
CAUSALITY
Nadel (1952) provides a different kind of
example of the interaction of witchcraft
accusations with causally relevant cogni-
tively based collective social structures
(formal age grades and the power—
including property—which goes with
each) and demographic factors in two
East African societies. In both societies,
when men enter the senior grade they
are supposed to turn over their politi-
cal power and major economic goods to
their heirs. In the society with few age
grades, the turnover takes place while
the new seniors are still relatively young,
vigorous, and ambitious. These “rising
seniors”—much resenting the pressure of
their heirs to move on and make room for
the next class—try to drag out the pro-
cess, which causes resentment among the
class of their heirs, which leads to accu-
sations of witchcraft against the seniors
(for trying to hold the heirs back). In the
society with a greater number of grades,
the seniors are older when the turnover
takes place, and more ready to move on,
and the class of heirs is in a middle-age
grade that entails a significant societal
role, and so they are much less apt to be
resentful. In Nadel’s examples, it is cul-
turally standardized knowledge about the
consequences of age grade membership
which produces (“causes”) the incidence
of witchcraft accusations.
Collective cognition that involves an
action is necessarily causative because it is
only the collective knowledge that makes
the action efficacious. That is, the products
of actions such as marriage (see below)
don’t exist unless relevant communities
recognize them.
Collective action of many sorts depends
on differentially shared and overlap-
ping knowledge, knowledge that involves
shared goals, shared procedures and rules,
shared expectations about likely actions,
and insightful interpersonal knowledge.
Mundane examples can be seen in the
behavior of a well-organized soccer or bas-
ketball team. Effective offense depends not
just on organized plays, but even more on
knowledge of teammates’ personal char-
acteristics in the context of a play and
of opponents’ likely responses. Successful
defense depends on a shared but shift-
ing dynamic understanding of the playing
space and the flow of action in it—not just
where the ball is or who has it, but where
it’s likely to go and how it’s going to get
there.
A similar kind of collective knowl-
edge was pointed out by Romer (1984) in
connection with the coordination among
members of an ancient Egyptian work
group implied by their production of art
forms in which a single line flows as
if carved in a continuous act by a sin-
gle hand—where size and material would
make execution by a single hand impos-
sible. Classical European painters’ ateliers
have sometimes exhibited that collective
unity.
Marriage is an example of collec-
tive cognition that can cause substantial
effects. Marriage can “cause” property
ownership (as in “Why does she own
that house?” “Because her husband bought
it, and it’s joint property”). People are
only married—with the resulting legal and
social concomitants—if they are known to
be married—even if that knowledge, in
their culture, presumes some efficacious
words or ritual. Much of kinship, in effect,
depends similarly on knowledge—except
that sometimes DNA can be appealed to.
Inheritance is an example of collective cog-
nitive causality—not just its reliance on
kinship but for the rules that members of
the culture have defined which specify who
gets a dead person’s stuff and, sometimes,
social and political role.
Cultural models (as in Kronenfeld,
2008 and see Bennardo and Kronenfeld,
2011) are one particular kind of collec-
tive cognitive system that can be indirectly
causal. They don’t directly make things
happen, but in a given situation they do
provide individuals with models for how
they might act in a given situation.
Other apparent examples of collective
cognitive causality include joint tasks by
a collection of people where none of the
participants know the full plan or system
and where there exist no explicit writ-
ten plans. Examples of such tasks include
Hutchins’ (1994) account of how an air-
craft carrier is actually navigated inside an
enclosed bay, Gatewood and Lowe’s (2008)
account of the nature and operation of
credit unions, and my own (Kronenfeld,
2011, pp. 575–576; 2014, p. 85) example of
house construction.
In Hutchins’ example, it is sailors’ indi-
vidual knowledge of their own specific
roles—including how their roles link with
those they immediately connect with—
that allows their behavior to fit into a
patterned process. The process is kept
aligned with the ultimate navigational task
(including interrelating the ship’s location
and speed relative to the shoreline, water
depth, other ships, and target dock) by
someone who puts the products of the
sailors’ action sequence into a format that
translates into the Bridge’s understanding
of the task and which is used as the basis
of instructions to the helm and engine
room—where timely execution is needed
to prevent crashes and cope with surprise
emergencies.
In Gatewood’s example, we see that
no one in the organization (not direc-
tors, officers, staff, or customers) held full
knowledge of the goals, organization, and
operation of a credit union, and that this
information was nowhere completely writ-
ten out. We see that—as it turned out—
somewhat divergent views were held (by
people in the different positions) of why
credit unions existed, what they were use-
ful for, and how they operated. Here, the
unifying shaping comes via customer’s sat-
isfaction and usage in response to staff
actions and financial offerings as guided by
officers.
In my example I examined the roles
involved in a small construction job—
adding rooms onto an existing house
in California. These roles include the
owner (who commissions and pays for the
work), an engineer who produces the plans
(incorporating building code standards),
the people who do the constructing, and
the city inspectors who check for code
compliance. Construction roles include
the contractor who oversees the job, the
carpenters, electricians, plumbers, floor
installers, wallboard installers, painters,
roofers, appliance installers, and so forth
who do the actual work. The construc-
tion people know their own jobs through
some combination of formal training and
experience, and this knowledge includes
how their roles interact with neighbor-
ing roles—thus they typically have some
knowledge and experience of the work
of these neighboring roles. Since this
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is a small job, and the level of exper-
tise required for some of these roles is
not too high, it is not uncommon for
one person to fill several of the roles—
depending on that person’s training and
experience. Commonly, the contractor will
have started as a carpenter, and often car-
penter/contractors have some experience
with simple electrical work and plumb-
ing, and so may or may not hire experts
to do such work, depending on availabil-
ity and price. The engineer’s plans are
never detailed enough to anticipate all
contingencies, and so much of the detail is
decided on the fly—sometimes in consul-
tation with the owner (who may or have
only limited knowledge). No one knows
all that is needed for the job. Typically,
the expert (relevant to a particular prob-
lem) makes decisions based on his or her
knowledge, and in consultation with oth-
ers directly affected; but both owners and
city code enforcers play major roles.
CONCLUSION
These examples illustrate how (success-
ful) collective action depends on systems
of collective knowledge and on individual
possession of relevant parts of that collec-
tive knowledge. The collective project can-
not take place without both collective and
individual knowledge, and so the knowl-
edge (i.e., cognition) has to be considered
causative.
Finally, an understanding of even indi-
vidual “causal cognition” requires atten-
tion to default understandings which often
are culturally based.
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